Inflation dynamics with labour market matching: assessing alternative specifications. NBB Working Papers. No. 164, May 19, 2009 by Christoffel, Kai et al.
Working Paper Research
Inflation dynamics with labour market 
matching : assessing alternative specifications
by Kai Christoffel, James Costain, Gregory de Walque,   
Keith Kuester, Tobias Linzert, Stephen Millard and Olivier Pierrard
  May 2009  No 164NBB WORKING PAPER No. 164 - MAY 2009
Editorial Director
Jan Smets, Member of the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Belgium
Statement of purpose:
The purpose of these working papers is to promote the circulation of research results (Research Series) and analytical
studies (Documents Series) made within the National Bank of Belgium or presented by external economists in seminars,
conferences and conventions organised by the Bank. The aim is therefore to provide a platform for discussion. The opinions
expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium.
Orders
For orders and information on subscriptions and reductions: National Bank of Belgium,
Documentation - Publications service, boulevard de Berlaimont 14, 1000 Brussels.
Tel +32 2 221 20 33 - Fax +32 2 21 30 42
The Working Papers are available on the website of the Bank: http://www.nbb.be.
©  National  Bank  of  Belgium,  Brussels
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
ISSN: 1375-680X (print)
ISSN: 1784-2476 (online)NBB WORKING PAPER No. 164 - MAY 2009
Abstract
This paper reviews recent approaches to modeling the labour market, and assesses their
implications for inflation dynamics through both their effect on marginal cost and on price-setting
behavior. In a search and matching environment, we consider the following modeling setups: right-
to-manage bargaining vs. efficient bargaining, wage stickiness in new and existing matches,
interactions at the firm level between price and wage-setting, alternative forms of hiring frictions,
search on-the-job and endogenous job separation. We find that most specifications imply too little
real rigidity and, so, too volatile inflation. Models with wage stickiness and right-to-manage
bargaining or with firm-specific labour emerge as the most promising candidates.
Key Words:  Inflation Dynamics, Labour Market, Business Cycle, Real Rigidities.
JEL Classification: E 31, E 32, E 24, J 64.
Corresponding authors:
Kai Christoffel, European Central Bank, Kaiserstraße 29, DE-60311 Frankfurt, e-mail:
kai.christoffel@ecb.int.
James Costain, División de Investigación, Servicio de Estudios, Banco de España, Calle Alcalá 50,
ES-28014 Madrid, e-mail: james.costain@bde.es.
Tobias Linzert, European Central Bank, Kaiserstraße 29, DE-60311 Frankfurt, e-mail:
tobias.linzert@ecb.int.
Gregory de Walque, Research Department, National Bank of Belgium, boulevard de Berlaimont 14,
BE-1000 Brussels, e-mail: gregory.dewalque@nbb.be.
Keith Kuester, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence
Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106, USA, e-mail: keith.kuester@phil.frb.org.
Stephen Millard, Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London EC2R 8AH, UK, e-mail:
stephen.millard@bankofengland.co.uk.
Olivier Pierrard, Banque Centrale du Luxembourg, 2, Boulevard Royal, LU-2983 Luxembourg,
e-mail: olivier.pierrard@bcl.lu.
Without implication, we would like to thank Raf Wouters for taking the initiative in suggesting this
project and participants in the Eurosystem Wage Dynamics Network for helpful comments.
This paper contains research conducted within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN). The WDN is a
research network consisting of economists from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national
central banks (NCBs) of the EU countries.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
held by the European Central Bank, any other central bank in the Eurosystem, the Bank of England,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.NBB WORKING PAPER - No. 164 - MAY 2009
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.  Introduction  and  motivation .................................................................................................1
2.  The baseline model  ..............................................................................................................  3
2.1.  Households, consumption and saving  ..................................................................................... 3
2.2.  Firms ...................................................................................................................................... 4
2.2.1  Final goods sector  ...........................................................................................................  4
2.2.2  Monopolistic retailers and price setting  ............................................................................  5
2.2.3  Intermediate goods sector  ...............................................................................................  5
2.3. The Labour market ................................................................................................................. 6
2.3.1  Labour market flows   .......................................................................................................  6
2.3.2  Value of a job and of a vacancy for an intermediate labour-services producer  ..................  7
2.3.3  Value of a job and value of unemployment for a household .............................................  7
2.4. Wage bargaining .................................................................................................................... 7
2.5.  Vacancy posting ..................................................................................................................... 9
2.6. Monetary policy, fiscal policy and market clearing ................................................................... 9
3.  Stylised facts and the baseline economy  ..........................................................................  10
3.1. Calibration of the model economies ...................................................................................... 10
3.2. Stylised facts - the transmission of monetary policy  ............................................................... 12
3.3.  Effects of a monetary policy shock in the baseline  ..............................................................  13
4.  Right-to-manage  bargaining  ..............................................................................................  13
5.  Wage rigidity  .......................................................................................................................  15
5.1.  Efficient bargaining ............................................................................................................... 17
5.2. Right-to-manage bargaining.................................................................................................. 18
6.  Real rigidities arising within the individual firm................................................................  20
7.  Contemporaneous  hiring  ...................................................................................................  24
8.  Variants of the vacancy posting process  ..........................................................................  26
8.1. Employment adjustment costs convex in the hiring rate ........................................................ 26
8.2. Vacancy costs as sunk costs ................................................................................................ 28
9.  On-the-job search  ...............................................................................................................  29
10.  Endogenous job destruction .............................................................................................  32
11.  Conclusions  ........................................................................................................................  37
12.  Appendix A: further evidence on monetary transmission in the euro area .............................. 43
National Bank of Belgium - Working paper series ......................................................................... 491 Introduction and motivation
The key task of central banks is to maintain price stability by controlling in￿ ation and,
for this reason, it is important to understand what drives the dynamics of in￿ ation. A
crucial element of this is the underlying nature of nominal and real frictions associated
with the adjustments of prices in the economy. A long tradition in monetary economics,
starting with Phillips (1958), has assigned labour market frictions and, in particular
wage-setting frictions, a central role in in￿ ation dynamics. Not least given the wide
diversity in labour market structures, institutions and policies across Europe, and the
world more generally, it is of interest to know whether or not heterogeneity in certain
aspects of the labour markets matters for in￿ ation dynamics and, hence, monetary
policy.
This paper analyses and compares existing labour market modeling approaches within
the New Keynesian business cycle model setup. In particular, it explains their impli-
cations for the behaviour of marginal cost and in￿ ation in theory and quantitatively
using a calibration with common parameters based on euro-area data. The paper high-
lights which of the particular features of each modeling approach are key for driving
in￿ ation dynamics and provides a structure to the rich variety of modeling approaches
in the existing literature.1 We follow an active strand of research that has set out
to model the labour market more explicitly within the New Keynesian business cycle
model, most often opting for including variants of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
model of search and matching frictions. The rationale for so doing comes from the
belief that sluggish responses in labour market variables to shocks are a natural place
to look for the origins of the sluggish response of in￿ ation to shocks. In terms of the
New Keynesian framework, labour market frictions will alter either aggregate marginal
cost or the ￿rms￿price-setting behaviour for given marginal cost.2 However, so far,
the implications for in￿ ation dynamics seem to be mixed. Some have, for example,
argued that accounting for equilibrium unemployment increases the resilience of mar-
ginal cost, and hence in￿ ation, to shocks by adding a pool of slack resources; see, e.g.,
Trigari (2005) and Walsh (2005). Others, e.g., Krause and Lubik (2007), conclude
that contrary to received wisdom wage rigidity does not impact on in￿ ation inertia.3
1Other papers, largely sparked by Shimer￿ s (2005) critique, seek to improve the modelling or
calibration of the labour market per se, and are not necessarily concerned with nominal frictions, e.g.,
Gertler and Trigari (2006), Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Yashiv (2006). In this paper, we take up
some of the suggestions made in these papers, as ￿through their implications for the behaviour of
wages and unemployment ￿they also imply changes in the behaviour of real marginal cost.
2Thus, the labour market was seen as a source of ￿ real rigidities￿ . For an overview of the extensive
literature on real rigidities more generally, see Woodford (2003).
3Another strand of literature has been concerned with normative implications, such as the design
of optimal monetary policy; see, e.g., Blanchard and Gali (2006), Faia (2008), Tang (2006).
1As a starting point, we choose the e¢ cient bargaining version of Trigari (2006): that
is, a plain New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and a distinction
between heads and hours. Building on this, we replace certain assumptions on the
labour market structure by others, one at a time. We consider the following vari-
ants: right-to-manage (instead of e¢ cient) bargaining (Trigari (2006)), stickiness of
wages in these setups (Gertler and Trigari (2006) and Christo⁄el and Linzert (2005))
di⁄erentiating between stickiness in new matches and existing matches (Bodart et al.
(2005) and Bodart et al. (2006)), interactions at the ￿rm-level between price and
wage-setting (Kuester (2007), Sveen and Weinke (2007) and Thomas (2008)), alter-
native forms of vacancy posting costs (Yashiv (2006)) and the hiring process (Fujita
and Ramey (2007)), search on-the-job (Krause and Lubik (2006) and van Zandweghe
(2009)) and endogenous separation (den Haan et al. (2000) and Zanetti (2007)). In
each of the cases we provide intuition for the e⁄ect that a speci￿c modi￿cation of the
baseline model has on in￿ ation dynamics.
Our ￿ndings are as follows. We show, ￿rst, that the baseline model predicts a response
of in￿ ation that is too large relative to the data, as a result of the large and immediate
response of real marginal cost. This would suggest either that the labour market
is not an important source of real rigidities or that the speci￿c way of modeling the
labour market does not capture the way the labour market a⁄ects in￿ ation dynamics
in practice. We follow the second route. When combined with a ￿ right-to-manage￿
assumption for the determination of hours, staggered wages at the level of the match
help to smooth the reaction of the marginal wage resulting in a smaller response to
shocks of marginal cost and in￿ ation. In￿ ation responds even less to shocks when we
account for the ￿rm-speci￿c nature of labour in the search and matching model. Doing
so, however, also has implications for the responses of unemployment and vacancies that
take these further away from the data. Variations of the hiring costs only have a small
impact on in￿ ation dynamics. In contrast, we ￿nd that endogenous separation may
be a promising candidate for reducing the response of in￿ ation to shocks, though this
￿nding depends critically on the calibration, as is the case for many of the examples.
More generally, by analysing a wide range of institutional features of the labour market
employing a variety of variants of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and
matching model, we show that only those institutional features that a⁄ect or generate
a direct channel from wages to in￿ ation matter for in￿ ation dynamics. By contrast,
institutional features that leave this channel una⁄ected matter much less for in￿ ation
dynamics.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the baseline
model. We highlight which are the features of the model that will be changed subse-
2quently. In section 3, we calibrate the baseline model to euro area data. Subsequently,
we compare the responses of in￿ ation (and wages and unemployment) to a monetary
policy shock in the model with the responses to the same shock in euro area data. In
section 4 we consider the e⁄ects of having ￿ right-to-manage￿bargaining and section
5 adds nominal wage rigidities for new and existing jobs, exploring how these rigidi-
ties interact with the bargaining scheme. Section 6 considers what happens if wages
and prices are set simultaneously in the presence of ￿rm-speci￿c labour. Section 7
allows for new hires being productive immediately and not only with a one-period de-
lay. In section 8 we discuss the e⁄ects of varying the free-entry condition and vacancy
costs. Sections 9 and 10 consider other margins along which adjustment can occur in
the labour market: section 9 discussing on-the-job search and section 10 discussing
endogenous job destruction. Section 11 concludes. An Appendix, as a point of
reference, presents empirical evidence on monetary transmission in the euro area.
2 The baseline model
In this section we lay out our baseline model, a simpli￿ed version of Trigari￿ s (2006)
e¢ cient bargaining model.
2.1 Households, consumption and saving
We assume that there is a continuum of workers indexed by j on the unit interval who
supply a homogeneous type of labour. Only a proportion nt of them are employed. We
adopt a representative ￿or large ￿household interpretation so that the unemployment
rate ut = 1 ￿ nt is identical at the household or at the aggregate level. As shown
by Merz (1995), the representative household assumption amounts to allowing for the
existence of state contingent securities o⁄ering workers insurance against di⁄erences
in their speci￿c labour income. Household members (workers) share their labour
income, ie, wage and unemployment bene￿ts, before choosing per capita consumption
and bond holdings. Labour income is made of the sum of hourly wages, wt, weighted
by total hours worked, ntht, and unemployment bene￿ts, b, weighted by the number of
unemployed, 1￿nt.4 As shareholders, households also receive the pro￿ts ￿t generated
by the monopolistic competitive retail ￿rms and the intermediate producers of labour
services.
We assume separability between leisure and consumption in the instantaneous utility
function, implying that all workers share the same marginal utility of wealth and choose
4b could alternatively be interpreted as the income generated by the domestic activities of an
unemployed worker.
3the same optimal consumption, be they employed or not. A worker￿ s utility can be
written as
U (cjt;hjt) =
c
1￿￿c
jt
1 ￿ ￿c
￿ ￿
h
1+￿
jt
1 + ￿
(1)
with ￿c ￿ 1;￿ > 0;￿ ￿ 0. Let Ht(j) be the value function of worker j. If we
momentarily leave aside the labour supply decision, which is taken by the household
as a whole, worker j￿ s maximisation program is
Ht(j) = max
cjt;Bjt+1
fU (cjt; hjt ) + ￿ ￿ EtHt+1(j)g
subject to
Bt
rtpt
+ ct + tt =
Bt￿1
pt
+ ntwtht + (1 ￿ nt)b + ￿t (2)
where workers hold their ￿nancial wealth in the form of one-period bonds, Bt, with
price 1=rt (where rt is the nominal interest rate), ct represents aggregate consumption,
tt are lump-sum taxes payable and pt is the consumer price index.
The worker￿ s optimal consumption and saving decision coincide with those of his peers
and are derived from the following ￿rst order conditions:
￿t
pt
= ￿ rtEt
￿
￿t+1
pt+1
￿
(3)
￿t = c
￿￿c
t (4)
2.2 Firms
In our baseline model, the economy consists of three sectors: a perfectly-competitive ￿-
nal good sector, a monopolistically-competitive retail sector and a perfectly-competitive
intermediate good sector.
2.2.1 Final goods sector
We assume a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods indexed by i on the unit interval.
Final good ￿rms aggregate the di⁄erentiated goods yt(i) produced by the retailers into
a homogeneous consumption good using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology
yt =
￿Z 1
0
[yt(i)]
￿p di
￿1=￿p
with ￿p 2 (0;1) (5)
where 1=￿p represents the retailers￿gross price mark-up while 1=(1 ￿ ￿p) is the elas-
ticity of substitution between intermediate di⁄erentiated goods. Each ￿nal good ￿rm
4maximises pro￿t, leading to the following demand for intermediate good i
yt(i) =
￿
pt(i)
pt
￿ 1
￿p￿1
yt (6)
where pt is the ￿nal good price, obtained by aggregation of the retailers prices
pt =
￿Z 1
0
[pt(i)]
￿p
￿p￿1 di
￿
￿p￿1
￿p
(7)
The modeling of the ￿nal good sector will remain unchanged throughout the paper.
2.2.2 Monopolistic retailers and price setting
Given the demand yt(i) retail ￿rm i faces for its product, it buys a homogeneous
intermediate labour good at nominal price ptxt per unit and transforms it one for one
into a di⁄erentiated product. In each period, a fraction 1 ￿ ￿p of retail ￿rms sets a
new price p￿
t(i). This price prevails j periods later with probability ￿
j
p. The price-
setting ￿rms maximise the discounted ￿ ows of expected real pro￿ts using a discount
rate consistent with that used by their shareholders (ie, households). All the price-
setting ￿rms face the same optimisation problem, implying that they all choose the
same new price p￿
t. Pro￿t maximisation results in the following ￿rst-order condition
Et
1 X
j=0
￿t;t+j
￿
￿p
￿j yt+j(i)
pt+j
￿
p
￿
t ￿
1
￿p
pt+jxt+j
￿
= 0; (8)
where ￿t;t+j := ￿
j ￿t+j
￿t denotes the stochastic discount factor. Log-linearising the re-
sulting expression around the steady state enables us to derive the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve
^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿p
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿p
￿
￿p
^ xt , (9)
where ￿t = pt=pt￿1 is the in￿ ation rate while ￿ hats￿denote percentage deviations from
steady state. This expression makes clear that, for a given response of in￿ ation to
movements in real marginal cost ￿which will depend on ￿p ￿the response of in￿ ation
to a given shock will depend on how real marginal cost, ^ xt, responds to that shock.
2.2.3 Intermediate goods sector
In the baseline model, there are a continuum of intermediate labour good producers
uniformly distributed and selling their output in a competitive market. Their only
5factor of production is labour, and labour e¢ ciency is decreasing with hours, so that
h hours supplied by one worker produce only h￿ units of e¢ cient labour, ￿ < 1.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), we assume that intermediate producers
can hire at most one worker so that their production is either zero or
y
l
t(o) = [ht(o)]
￿ with ￿ < 1 ,
where o indicates match o. In the baseline the intermediate goods sector and the
retailers are linked through competitive markets for the intermediate good. In section
6, we assess the implications for in￿ ation dynamics once these two sectors are merged so
that there are interactions between wage and price setting at the level of the individual
￿rm.
2.3 The labour market
The labour market is organised such that it links the intermediate good ￿rms and the
workers.
2.3.1 Labour market ￿ ows
Let mt denote the number of new ￿rm-worker matches. We assume that the number
of matches is a function of the number of job vacancies vt and e⁄ective job seekers ut,
and we consider the following linear homogeneous matching function:
mt = ￿m u
#
t v
1￿#
t (10)
with ￿m > 0 and # 2 (0;1).5 In the baseline, the probability an unemployed worker
￿nds a job is given by
st =
mt
ut
(11)
while the probability that a ￿rm ￿lls a vacancy is given by
qt =
mt
vt
. (12)
An exogenous proportion ￿ of ￿rm-worker relationships ends each period, which implies
the following employment dynamics:
nt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt￿1 + mt￿1 . (13)
5Models with search on-the-job (section 9) modify the matching function to depend also on the
number of employed workers seeking jobs.
6In the baseline therefore employment is predetermined, while hours per worker are free
to adjust contemporaneously. This means that marginal costs are in the ￿rst period
after a shock in￿ uenced exclusively by the marginal cost of an additional hour worked
on the intensive margin. We ease this assumption in section 7, where we allow for
contemporaneous hiring, and in section 10, which looks at endogenous separation.
2.3.2 Value of a job and of a vacancy for an intermediate labour-services
producer
Firms and workers bargain over wages; such bargaining distributes the rents that arise
once a match is formed to both the ￿rm and the worker. We denote by Jt and Vt,
respectively, the asset value of a job and of a vacancy at period t, dropping match
index i for convenience:
Jt = y
l
txt ￿ htwt + Et
￿
￿t;t+1(1 ￿ ￿)Jt+1
￿
, (14)
Vt = ￿k
v
t + Et
￿
￿t;t+1 [qtJt+1 + (1 ￿ qt)Vt+1]
￿
, (15)
where kv
t represents the per-period hiring cost (in units of the consumption good).
2.3.3 Value of a job and value of unemployment for a household
For a worker￿ s family, which bargains on his behalf, the value of a new job is given by
Wt = htwt ￿
￿
￿t
h
1+￿
t
1 + ￿
+ Et
￿
￿t;t+1 [(1 ￿ ￿) Wt+1 + ￿ Ut+1]
￿
; (16)
where Ut represents the present value of being unemployed at period t. Formally,
Ut = b + Et
￿
￿t;t+1 [st Wt+1 + (1 ￿ st) Ut+1]
￿
: (17)
2.4 Wage bargaining
In this section, we discuss the bargaining over wages and hours between workers and
￿rms once a match has been formed. We will focus here on a bargaining scheme that
leads to Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes. Hours and wages are bargained over simultaneously
and the bargained wage and hours maximise the joint surplus of the ￿rm and the
worker.6 The outcome of the bargaining process is obtained by maximisation of the
6Also, in the baseline we abstract from any wage rigidity. We will look at a di⁄erent, right-to-
manage bargaining scheme in section 4, and will analyze in section 5 what real wage rigidity means
for in￿ ation and unemployment dynamics under the respective bargaining schemes.
7Nash product:
max
wt;ht
(Wt ￿ Ut)
￿ (Jt ￿ Vt)
1￿￿ : (18)
The ￿rst term of the Nash product is the surplus a worker obtains from a job, raised to
the worker￿ s relative bargaining power ￿ 2 (0;1). The second term is the ￿rm surplus,
raised to the ￿rm￿ s relative bargaining power 1 ￿ ￿.
Under e¢ cient bargaining, the ￿rst-order conditions can be shown to simplify to
￿
￿t
h
￿
t = xt￿h
￿￿1
t = ￿
xtyl
t
ht
: (19)
This shows that the wage paid in any individual matches is not allocative for hours
in existing matches, that is @ht=@wt = 0. Note that xt, the price of the intermediate
goods, coincides with the marginal cost for price-setting ￿rms. Rearranging the above
equation
xt =
￿
h
￿
t
￿t
￿h
￿￿1
t
￿
mrst
mplt
(20)
highlights the implications of e¢ cient bargaining for marginal costs (and in￿ ation).
Real marginal cost will equal the worker￿ s marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure (mrst) divided by the real marginal product of labour (mplt).
Both of these will, in turn, depend on hours worked per employee. E¢ ciency requires
that the marginal gain to the ￿rm of an additional hour worked (the ￿rm￿ s marginal
value product of labour, xtmplt) is the same as the marginal cost to the worker of
that hour (his marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, mrst).
This makes clear that this subjective price of work determines the marginal wage, the
marginal cost of producing intermediate goods and the marginal cost of producing dif-
ferentiated goods. Note that, in contrast, the average hourly wage rate, wt, does not
measure marginal costs in the above setup.7
This bargaining procedure maximises the joint surplus of the match, that is Jt +Wt ￿
Ut ￿ Vt.8 The ￿rst-order condition for the wage bargaining simpli￿es to
￿ (Jt ￿ Vt) = (1 ￿ ￿)(Wt ￿ Ut) (21)
which states that each of the contracting parties receives a share of the total surplus
7The marginal cost here is determined by having an employed worker work for an additional hour,
while the average wage rate averages over all hours worked (including the infra-marginal hours).
8Note that all terms in the wage cancel in the joint surplus of workers and ￿rms since the wage is
not allocative in e¢ cient bargaining.
8proportional to its relative bargaining power.
2.5 Vacancy posting
In order to ￿nd a worker, and so in order to produce, labour ￿rms have to post a
vacancy ￿rst. In the baseline we follow Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Merz
(1995), and assume a constant, per period, cost of opening up a vacancy, kv
t = ￿.9 Free
entry in the market for vacancies implies that in equilibrium the value of a vacancy is
Vt = 0 in every period t and the equation for the asset value of a vacancy (15) can be
recast as:
￿ = qt Et
￿
￿t;t+1 Jt+1
￿
. (22)
where total vacancy costs are given by ￿vt, and the average cost per hiring is ￿=qt.
Using this, the value of a job for a ￿rm simpli￿es to
Jt = y
l
txt ￿ htwt + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
qt
. (23)
From equations (22) and (23), one easily obtains the dynamic representation of the
average cost per hire
￿
qt
= Et
￿
￿t;t+1
￿
y
l
t+1xt+1 ￿ ht+1wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
qt+1
￿￿
(24)
which determines job creation in the model.
2.6 Monetary policy, ￿scal policy and market clearing
Throughout the paper we assume that monetary policy is conducted according to the
following Taylor rule
^ rt = ￿r^ rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)￿￿^ ￿t￿1 + ￿
m
t (25)
with ￿r ￿ 0 and ￿￿ > 1 and ￿
m
t is an i.i.d. interest rate shock.10 Lump-sum taxes,
tt; are set so as to balance the budget period by period and there is no autonomous
9We look at alternative assumptions about vacancy posting costs in section 8.
10The Taylor rule that we use in this paper only requires lagged information. It is therefore im-
plementable. A further advantage of using this speci￿cation is that the initial reaction of nominal
rates to a monetary easing is the same in all the model variants that we discuss. We only in￿ ation
and lagged rates in the Taylor rule. This ensures that the nominal rate is not directly in￿ uenced by
di⁄erences in the output dynamics, which improves comparability across model variants.
9government spending. Finally, equilibrium in the ￿nal goods market implies11
yt = ct : (26)
3 Stylised facts and the baseline economy
The aim of this paper is to elicit the role of speci￿c labour market frictions for the
behaviour of marginal cost and in￿ ation. In order to obtain a measure of the empirical
relevance of the respective approaches, we compare the responses to a monetary policy
easing in the respective model variant to stylised facts for the euro area.
3.1 Calibration of the model economies
In order to put all variants on the same footing, the calibration is harmonised as
much as possible. The calibration largely follows Christo⁄el et al. (2009) and matches
salient features of the euro area between 1984 and 2006. Table 1 presents the assigned
common parameter values.
The time-discount factor, ￿, is chosen to match an average annual real rate of 3.3%.
We set ￿ to 10, implying an elasticity of substitution for labour of 0.1, in line with ￿
but at the lower end of ￿microeconomic studies for the euro area.12 The value of the
risk aversion coe¢ cient is set to ￿c = 1:5, following Smets and Wouters (2003).
Turning to the labour good sector and the labour market, we set ￿ = 0:99, so there
are almost constant-returns to hours per employee.13 On monthly data ranging to
the early 1990s, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) estimate an elasticity of matches with
respect to unemployment of # = 0:7 for France, Germany and Spain. Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001) survey estimates of the matching function for European countries and
for the United States and conclude that a range from # = 0:5 to # = 0:7 is admissible.
We select the midpoint, setting # = 0:6. The bargaining power of workers is set to a
conventional value: ￿ = 0:5.
For the variants of the model we consider later that involve wage stickiness, we follow
the recent evidence of du Caju et al. (2008), which reports average wage contract
11We assume that vacancy posting costs are taxes which are rebated lump-sum to the consumers
and which do not require real ressources. This simpli￿es the comparability of the di⁄erent modelling
variants.
12The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of labor, 1/￿, is small in most microeconomic studies
(between 0 and 0.5) for the euro area, see Evers, Mooij, and Vuuren (2005) for details, who report
statistics based on a meta sample as well as estimates based on Dutch data.
13Our model does not contain capital. In some of the variants, there is thus a trade-o⁄ between
obtaining a reasonable labour share (of around 60%) and small ex post pro￿ts associated with jobs.
We opt to ￿t the latter, and choose ￿ = 0:99 instead of a lower value.
10Preferences
￿ .992 Time-discount factor (matches annual real rate of 3.3 percent).
￿ 10 labour supply elasticity of 0.1.
￿c 1.5 Risk aversion.
Bargaining, Intermediate Producers and Labour Market
￿ .99 labour elasticity of production (close to constant-returns-to-scale).
# .6 Elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment.
￿ .5 Bargaining power of workers
￿w .83 Calvo stickiness wages (avg. wage duration 6 qtrs), where applicable.
Monopolistic Retail Sector and Price Setting
￿p 1/1.1 Price-markup of 10 percent.
￿p .75 Calvo stickiness of prices (average duration of 4 qrts).
Monetary Policy
￿￿ 1.5 Response to in￿ ation in Taylor rule.
￿R .85 Interest rate smoothing coe¢ cient in Taylor rule.
Table 1: Parameters and their calibrated values. The Table reports calibrated
parameter values that are identical over the di⁄erent modeling approaches. The model is calibrated
to the euro area from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4.
durations for various euro area countries of between one and three years. Where
applicable, we therefore set the degree of nominal wage rigidity to ￿w = 0:83; which
implies an average wage duration of 6 quarters.
In the price-setting sector, we calibrate the markup to a conventional value of 10%,
so ￿p = 1=1:1 (in the Dixit-Stiglitz setup this implies a price-elasticity of demand of
￿ = 11). For the average contract duration of prices we use the results of Alvarez et
al. (2005) and set the corresponding Calvo parameter to ￿p = 0:75, which amounts
to an average price duration of 4 quarters. As is conventional, we set the response
of monetary policy to in￿ ation to ￿￿ = 1:5 and allow for interest rate smoothing by
setting ￿R = 0:85.
Given these parameters, we set the other parameters of our models to ensure that
the steady state values for certain endogenous variables coincided across the di⁄erent
setups. The target values for these variables, shown in Table 2, thereby implicitly
de￿ne the values of the remaining model parameters.
The steady state unemployment rate is targeted to be u = 9%, in line with the average
of the euro-area unemployment rate over the sample 1984 to 2006. We target a
probability of ￿nding a worker for an open vacancy of q = 0:7, in line with the euro-
area evidence collected in Christo⁄el et al. (2009). Our target for steady state hours
11Value Explanation
u 9% Unemployment rate
q 70% Probability of ￿nding a worker
h 1 Hours worked per employee.
b
wh 65% Unemployment bene￿ts replacement rate.
￿ .06 Quarterly separation rate.
Table 2: Calibration Targets. The table reports cali-
brated parameter values. The model is calibrated to the euro area
from 1984Q1 to 2006Q4.
worked per employee is h = 1. We set the replacement income b so as to ensure that
the replacement rate in steady state in each of the variants, b
wh, equals 65%, in line with
the net replacement rates published by the OECD in its set of ￿ Bene￿ts and Wages￿
data. Finally, the evidence collected in Christo⁄el et al. (2009) and Hobijn and Sahin
(2007) points to quarterly separation rates, from a worker ￿ ow perspective, of ￿ = 6%.
3.2 Stylised facts ￿the transmission of monetary policy
In response to a monetary shock that causes interest rates to fall by 100 basis points
in annualised terms, empirical evidence from the literature and our own VAR (see
Appendix) shows that in the euro area:14
Fact 1: output rises signi￿cantly above its steady state. Depending on the study the
peak response varies between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points.
Fact 2: in￿ ation rises. The peak increase in year-on-year in￿ ation lies between 0.2 and
0.3 percentage points.
Fact 3: wages per employee also rise but by less than output (in percentage terms).
Fact 4: employment rises signi￿cantly, and unemployment falls. Unemployment falls by
3% to 4.5% (number of heads), and the unemployment rate falls by 0.25 to 0.4
percentage points.
Fact 5: most of the adjustment in labour is borne by the number of employees rather
than by hours worked per employee. Some uncertainty surrounds this statement,
14While signi￿cant di⁄erences exist in the microstructure of the economy, and the labour market in
particular, between the euro area, the United States and the United Kingdom the above stylised facts
happen to be consistent also with the evidence for the United States, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005),
Angeloni et al. (2003) and Trigari (2005), and the evidence for the United Kingdom, e.g., Millard
(2008).
12though, as the data for hours worked in the euro area are of relatively poor
quality.15
In the following, we assess each of the di⁄erent modeling variants against these ￿ve
stylised facts.
3.3 E⁄ects of a monetary policy shock in the baseline
As a ￿rst check against this evidence, Figure 1 reports the response of the economy to a
monetary easing, where the impulse is an exogenous one percentage point reduction in
the nominal interest rate. As can be seen in Figure 1, in the baseline in￿ ation responds
far too strongly to the monetary easing (by a factor of ten) while output e⁄ects are of
the appropriate size. The strong response of in￿ ation comes from the fact that real
marginal costs for price setting ￿rms are largely determined by the cost of increasing
hours worked by each worker. Under e¢ cient bargaining, the baseline case, these
marginal costs are given by the marginal rate of substitution divided by the marginal
product of labour, xt = mrst
mplt. Given near constant returns to scale (￿ close to unity),
the marginal product of labour, mplt, will be little a⁄ected. The percentage change
in real marginal cost will therefore be driven by the response of the marginal rate of
substitution, mrst. This in turn depends on the percentage change in the marginal
utility of consumption and, fundamentally, on the response of hours per worker, where
the latter is ampli￿ed ￿ times. Given our calibration, this implies a strong response
of real marginal cost to an increase in hours worked and output.16
The remainder of the paper alters features of the model that a⁄ect the response of
in￿ ation to shocks. We start by assessing a di⁄erent bargaining scheme.
4 Right-to-manage bargaining
In this section, we consider an alternative process for bargaining over wages and hours.
In particular, we follow Trigari (2006) and use a ￿ right-to-manage￿assumption for the
15For example, no quarterly series for actual hours worked exists for the euro area, or individually
for all its member states. The measured response of hours worked (and hours per worker) therefore
naturally is based on proxy series, cp. Appendix A.
16While the average wage rate does not have a direct bearing on in￿ ation, there is an indirect e⁄ect.
Employment and unemployment are determined by the job creation condition, (24). As illustrated in
Figure 1, in the baseline model the real wage response to the monetary policy shock is large. Trigari
(2006) highlights that solving the Shimer (2005) puzzle in the benchmark model also helps to reduce
the response of in￿ ation. If more of the labour adjustment needed to produce the additional output
is provided through the extensive (number of employees) margin, the intensive (hours per employee)
margin will also react less, which curbs the rise in the marginal rate of substitution and thus the rise
in marginal costs.
13bargaining process. In this setup, the wage rate is agreed upon ￿rst and then the ￿rm is
free to choose hours worked at that wage rate so as to maximise pro￿ts. The same wage
rate applies to marginal and inframarginal hours worked. This setting seems reasonable
for a number of wage contracts. In addition, it also preserves much of the empirically
successful structure of the New Keynesian model.17 The ￿rst-order condition for labour
demand is:
xt￿h
￿￿1
t = wt () xt =
wtht
￿yl
t
=
wt
mplt
: (27)
meaning that that the cost of the marginal hour is equal to its bene￿ts, ie, that the
hourly wage is equal to the marginal value product of an hour worked. The right-to-
manage assumption radically modi￿es the composition of real marginal cost. Under
e¢ cient bargaining, real marginal cost depends on hours and the marginal utility of
consumption. Under right-to-manage, the hourly wage becomes an essential element
of real marginal cost, opening what Christo⁄el et al. (2009) and Trigari (2006), for
example, term the ￿ wage channel￿ . Therefore, the response of marginal cost and
in￿ ation to shocks will depend entirely upon the response of the bargained hourly
wage to shocks.18
This notwithstanding, the e⁄ect of the right-to-manage assumption on marginal cost
and in￿ ation in equilibrium is a priori unclear. The major di⁄erence to the e¢ cient
bargaining assumption is that the choice of hours depends directly on the average wage,
and that @ht=@wt < 0. This a⁄ects the wage bargaining. Wage equation (21) becomes
￿￿t (Jt ￿ Vt) = (1 ￿ ￿)(Wt ￿ Ut) (28)
with
￿t =
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿
mrst
xtmplt
￿ ￿
￿
=
1
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿ht
1+￿￿￿
￿￿txt
￿ ￿
￿
(29)
This means that the relative bargaining power of the workers in the wage negotiation
is modi￿ed by ￿t: equations (28) and (29) suggest that the workers￿bargaining power
increases with hours worked.19 The more inelastic the labour supply at the intensive
17Following Erceg et al. (2000), when modeling wage rigidities the literature typically assumes that
monopolistically competitive labor ￿rms produce an intermediate labor good. The assumption is that
these ￿rms set wages (the equivalent to the wage rate here) in a staggered manner and let labor output
and thus input of hours into labor-good production (the equivalent to hours per employee here) be
demand-determined.
18This does not, of course, mean that the marginal rate of substitution plays no role in in￿ ation
dynamics under right-to-manage. There is still an indirect in￿ uence of the marginal rate of substitution
on in￿ ation through its e⁄ect on the bargained wage.
19If we keep the free entry assumption and constant recurrent vacancy posting costs, equation (22)
still holds. The value of a job for a ￿rm (23) and the dynamic of the average cost per hiring (24) can
be simpli￿ed by replacing xtyl
t by htwt=￿.
14margin (the larger is ￿), the stronger this e⁄ect. If ￿ is large enough, the average wage
will tend to be more responsive under right-to-manage than under e¢ cient bargaining
because of the strong relative bargaining power e⁄ect. It is less clear, however, whether
this also implies that marginal costs are more responsive. Under right-to-manage, the
marginal wage coincides with the average wage, wt, which is more responsive than the
average wage would be under e¢ cient bargaining. Under e¢ cient bargaining however,
the marginal wage, given by mrst, is already more responsive than the average wage.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 compares the response of the economy to a monetary shock under both bar-
gaining schemes. As the above logic suggests, the average hourly wage rate, wt;
responds more strongly (and in fact much too strongly in view of the stylised facts) to
a monetary easing under right-to-manage. Still, the marginal wage rates (which deter-
mine the marginal cost of ￿rms) show a very similar movement under both bargaining
schemes, as can be seen in the similar response of marginal cost under the two schemes,
leaving the response of in￿ ation to a monetary policy shock essentially unchanged.20
We conclude that the bargaining scheme in itself has little implication for in￿ ation
dynamics. As the next section shows, however, di⁄erent bargaining schemes can
imply fundamentally di⁄erent e⁄ects of wage rigidity on in￿ ation dynamics.
5 Wage rigidity
A cornerstone of the canonical New Keynesian framework is that average wage rates
and their stickiness are instrumental for in￿ ation dynamics, see, eg, Christiano et al.
(2005). This section of the paper discusses the role of wage stickiness for in￿ ation
dynamics once search and matching frictions in the labour market are accounted for.
The related New Keynesian literature is Trigari (2006), Christo⁄el and Linzert (2005),
Christo⁄el and Kuester (2008), and Krause and Lubik (2008).
In the model, the role of wage stickiness for in￿ ation dynamics depends on the type
of wage bargaining along which the model economy is organised (e¢ cient vs. right-
to-manage) as well as on whether wage stickiness a⁄ects only existing matches or also
new matches (and thus hiring incentives of ￿rms). We assume that in each period
only a fraction (1-￿
o
w) of all existing wage contracts is renegotiated. New hires are paid
20The di⁄erent response in the average wage rate caused by the bargaining power e⁄ect does,
however, imply di⁄erences in the response of unemployment. The average wage rate responds by
more under right-to-manage and thus leaves relatively less of the increased revenue in the hand of
the ￿rms, thereby reducing hiring incentives. As a consequence, this leads to a smaller response of
employment under right-to-manage than under e¢ cient bargaining. This in turn leads to slightly
more recourse to the intensive margin under right-to-manage than under e¢ cient bargaining, which
reinforces the increase in the wage and thus marginal costs.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a monetary easing ￿baseline vs. right-
to-manage. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in the quarterly
nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady state. Interest
rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line marks the baseline
response with e¢ cient bargaining. The red dashed line shows the response under right-to-manage
bargaining.
16either the existing nominal contract wage from the previous period (with respective
probabilities ￿
n
w) or they freely negotiate the wage (with probability 1 ￿ ￿
n
w). Full
nominal wage ￿ exibility obtains if ￿
o
w = ￿
n
w = 0.21
Even though the wage bargaining will be discussed in detail later, it is important at
this stage to stress that all the ￿ ￿rm-worker￿pairs that are given the opportunity to
(re)-negotiate their wage contract face the same problem and therefore set the same
wage. Because wage negotiation is time-dependent, di⁄erent workers may be paid
di⁄erent wages and can supply di⁄erent hours, even though they are otherwise ex-ante
identical.
5.1 E¢ cient bargaining
Under e¢ cient bargaining, as we showed earlier, real marginal cost will equal the
workers￿marginal rate of substitution divided by their marginal product and will be
independent of the average wage rate in existing matches.22 For that reason, wage
rigidity, if it only a⁄ects existing matches, does not have a bearing on in￿ ation dynamics
if bargaining is e¢ cient.
Matters change if wage stickiness a⁄ects the wages of prospective new hires. As
the vacancy posting condition equation makes clear, hiring incentives depend on the
expected pro￿ts of ￿rms. Wages are important in allocating the surplus of the match
among ￿rms and workers. As Hall (2005) notes, wage stickiness in new matches
enhances the cyclicality of job creation by altering the share of revenue left to ￿rms
over the cycle. Since hiring incentives are a⁄ected, future marginal costs and, thus,
in￿ ation will be a⁄ected as well. The reason is that the hiring behaviour of ￿rms
in￿ uences the economy-wide relative use of the extensive margin and the intensive
margin of employment and this will have a direct bearing on marginal costs, as a result
of the decreasing returns to hours worked per employee, ￿ ￿ 1, and the increasing
marginal disutility of work ￿ > 0.23 Wage stickiness, insofar as it a⁄ects new matches,
21These matches draw a wage from the previous period￿ s wage distribution. The rationale for
this assumption, following Gertler and Trigari (2006), lies in interpreting a match as one position
in a multiworker ￿rm. While every period there may be new hires for some positions, these ￿rms
may adjust they overall pay-scale only infrequently. There is currently debate about whether there is
evidence in the data that wages of new hires are sticky. Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag, and
van Rens (2007), for example, ￿nd little empirical support for wage stickiness for new hires.
22The reason is that in existing matches the average wage rate is not allocative but rather splits the
surplus of the match among the two parties. In particular, even when ￿xing the average hourly wage
rate, this does not ￿x the hourly wage rate schedule. As part of an e¢ cient bargaining agreement,
the relevant section of marginal wages can be freely set in a state-contingent way even if average wage
rates are ￿xed.
23See also Trigari (2006). Krause and Lubik (2008) ￿nd that wage stickiness is irrelevant for
in￿ ation dynamics. This rests on their assumption that there is only an extensive margin, in which
case marginal costs indeed are little a⁄ected.
17makes hiring more responsive to a monetary easing. This means that the demand-
driven increase in labour input is borne more by the number of employees rather than
by hours worked. As a result, the average worker works fewer hours than in the
absence of wage stickiness. This means that the marginal rate of substitution rises
less strongly, and also that the marginal product of labour falls less strongly. So, wage
stickiness for new hires, through its e⁄ect on employment, makes marginal costs (and
thus in￿ ation) less responsive to a monetary easing.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 illustrates the empirical implications of this. In the baseline setup, equation
(13) implies that employment only reacts with a lag. With wage stickiness in new
matches, employment reacts more strongly. This leads to a quicker fall in the response
of hours, lowering the persistence of the responses of marginal cost and in￿ ation. While
future marginal costs and in￿ ation thereby react less than in the absence of wage
rigidity, quantitatively the di⁄erences are tiny, as Figure 2 illustrates. Complementing
the results in this section, Section 7 assesses the case when the baseline is modi￿ed to
allow for contemporaneous hiring, in which case employment is a jump variable and
the initial response of hours worked per employee is thereby attenuated.
5.2 Right-to-manage bargaining
Section 4 highlighted that right-to-manage implies a close relationship between hours
worked and the wage. In this section, we allow for stickiness in these wages. In
particular, if the wage of a worker has been bargained i periods ago, he or she will
work
ht(w
￿
t￿i) =
￿
￿
xt
w￿
t￿i
pt
pt￿i
￿ 1
1￿￿
= ht￿i(w
￿
t￿i)
￿
￿
xt
xt￿i
pt
pt￿i
￿ 1
1￿￿
(30)
hours. Here, we let w￿
t￿i =
w
n;￿
t￿i
pt represent the real value of the nominal wage negotiated
at time t ￿ i. w
n;￿
t￿i is the nominal wage rate negotiated i periods ago, which for some
matches will continue to prevail today.
The asset value of a job clearly depends on the bargained wage. Adopting the viewpoint
of an intermediate producer, we denote by Jt(w￿
t￿j) the asset value in period t of a job
with a wage that was bargained i periods ago. Ex ante, the asset value of a new match
for the ￿rm can be written as
Jt = (1 ￿ ￿
n
w) Jt(w
￿
t) + ￿
n
w Jt(wt￿1) (31)
where wt is the average real value of all hourly wages. The asset value of a vacant job
Vt is still given by equation (15), ie, the vacancy posting condition is not modi￿ed.
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Figure 2: monetary easing ￿Efficient Bargaining and wage rigidity old
and new hires. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in the
quarterly nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady
state. Interest rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line marks
the baseline response. A red dashed line marks the response when both wages of new hires and of old
matches are sticky. The green dotted line shows the response when only wages of old hires are sticky.
19All the (re-)negotiating ￿rm-worker couples face the same problem and therefore choose
the same wage w￿
t through the usual Nash bargaining procedure
max
w￿
t
[Wt(w
￿
t) ￿ Ut]
￿ [Jt(w
￿
t)]
1￿￿
where the worker￿ s surplus, Wt(w￿
t) ￿ Ut, takes into account the fact that wages may
not be renegotiated immediately. After some algebra, we obtain the wage equation
for wages negotiated at time t
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0
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t) ￿ Ut] (32)
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Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 shows the response to a monetary easing in the right-to-manage model with
￿ exible wages (which are similar to the e¢ cient bargaining baseline) and the two al-
ternatives with nominal wage rigidities. Two observations are in order. First and
foremost, the combination of the right-to-manage bargaining with nominal wage sticki-
ness produces much more rigid wages. These translate into a more reasonable response
of in￿ ation, and into in￿ ation persistence. In other words, the combination of sticky
wages with ￿ right-to-manage￿bargaining is able to generate a magnitude of the re-
sponse of in￿ ation to a monetary policy shock that is in line with the stylised facts.
This follows directly from the fact that in right-to-manage bargaining, there is a direct
cost channel from wages to marginal cost to in￿ ation. Second, the responses are very
similar for the two cases of wage rigidity. Whether wage rigidity a⁄ects only existing
matches, or all matches, does not matter much for in￿ ation dynamics; Christo⁄el and
Kuester (2008) make a similar point.
6 Real rigidities arising within the individual ￿rm
Following most of the existing literature, the baseline assumed that price-setting ￿rms
can buy labour goods, yl
t; in a competitive factor market at cost xt per unit. They
then transform this into a di⁄erentiated product. Due to this assumption, price-setting
￿rms￿marginal costs are independent of their own output level. In that setup only if
20aggregate marginal costs are more rigid will in￿ ation be more rigid. Following Kuester
(2007), this section instead merges the intermediate labour good sector with the retail
sector and emphasises real rigidities arising at the individual ￿rm level over and above
the real rigidities arising at the aggregate level. Related papers are Sveen and Weinke
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a monetary easing right-to-manage with
wage rigidity. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in the
quarterly nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady
state. Interest rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line shows
the response in the right-to-manage model in the absence of wage rigidity. The red dashed line shows
the response when all wages are sticky. The green dotted line shows the case in which wage rigidity
a⁄ects only existing matches.
22(2007) and Thomas (2008).
The presence of search and matching frictions in the labour market means that a worker
in this economy temporarily constitutes a ￿rm-speci￿c factor of production to the ￿rm
at which he is employed.24 This, in turn, means that a ￿rm￿ s price-setting has an
e⁄ect not only on the demand that the ￿rm faces but also on the wage demand of its
worker, and thus on the ￿rm￿ s own marginal costs.
As a consequence, for any given behaviour of aggregate marginal costs, ￿rms are in-
duced to adjust prices by less. The mechanism at work is the following. Consider
an aggregate shock that all else equal would imply an increase in the marginal cost of
all ￿rms. A ￿rm that can re-optimise its price passes part of the cost increase on to
consumers. The increase in its price causes a fall in demand. This fall in demand
will be the stronger the more price-elastic is demand, ie, the larger is ￿ = 1
1￿￿p. In
turn hours worked at the ￿rm fall (they fall by more the more the production function
exhibits decreasing returns to scale, ie, the smaller is ￿). So, in sum, hours worked
fall the more in response to a price increase, the larger is ￿ and the smaller is ￿. If
workers have an increasing marginal disutility of work, ie, ￿ > 0, this fall in hours
worked leads to a reduction in the worker￿ s marginal disutility of work. Therefore, at
the time of deciding on the price the ￿rm sets, it anticipates that the price increase
would induce an e⁄ect that balances the original increase in marginal costs: workers
take part of the original cost increase on themselves by accepting lower marginal wage
rates. This implies that price setting ￿rms decide to move their prices by less for any
given behaviour of aggregate marginal costs than in the baseline model, curbing the
response of in￿ ation to shocks relative to the benchmark model.25
This intuition is captured in the New Keynesian Phillips curve for the modi￿ed model
economy:
b ￿t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Et fb ￿t+1g +
1 ￿ ￿p
￿p
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿p
￿￿
1
1 + ￿
￿[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]
￿
b xt: (33)
With respect to the baseline New Keynesian Phillips curve, equation (9), there is an
additional term dampening the pass-through of marginal cost on in￿ ation (underlined).
As the above discussion suggested, the more price-elastic is demand (the larger is ￿),
24In the intermediate labor sector of the baseline model, workers also constituted a temporarily
￿rmspeci￿c production factor. By assumption, however, this sector operated under perfect competition
and ￿ exible prices.
25It seems important to distinguish between real rigidities arising at the aggregate level and real
rigidities arising at the individual ￿rm level. For real rigidities arising at the aggregate level, as in Ball
and Romer (1990), prices (and thus in￿ ation) will respond the less to shocks the less (the aggregate
component of) marginal cost responds to these shocks. For real rigidities arising at the individual
￿rm level, prices will respond the less to shocks the more (the ￿rm-speci￿c component of) any ￿rm￿ s
marginal cost rises with demand. For a further exposition, see also Woodford (2003, Chapter 3).
23the more curved the marginal disutility of labour is (the larger ￿) and the faster the
returns to hours per employee decrease at the ￿rm level (the smaller ￿), the less will
￿rms adjust prices to aggregate shocks, and the weaker will therefore be the response
of in￿ ation to its aggregate driving forces.
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Figure 4 compares the impulse response to a monetary easing in the baseline model
to the model with ￿rm-speci￿c labour. The additional factor in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (33) is equal to
n
1
1+ ￿
￿[(1￿￿)+￿]
o
= 0:009. As a result, in￿ ation reacts
considerably less to the monetary shock when allowing for ￿rm-speci￿c labour, bringing
the response more in line with the stylised facts. In turn, this implies that the monetary
easing provides more stimulus, which translates into a response of output that is larger
than in the baseline.
7 Contemporaneous hiring
In the variants of the search model discussed above there was a one period lag before a
worker hired in t takes on the job. In light of the empiricial evidence on short term ￿ uc-
tuations in employment, it is useful to look at a variant allowing for contemporaneous
hiring.26 This section follows Ravenna and Walsh (2007) and assumes the following
timing. As before, at the beginning of each period some ￿rms and workers randomly
separate. Firms that are not matched with a worker can post vacancies. Contrary
to the case in previous sections however, the successful matches become productive in
the same period. So employment evolves according to nt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt￿1 + mt. This
timing assumption implies the following ￿ ow values for the value of a job to the ￿rm
and the value of a vacancy
Jt = y
l
txt ￿ htwt + Et
￿
￿t;t+1(1 ￿ ￿)Jt+1
￿
, (34)
Vt = ￿￿ + qtJt + Et
￿
￿t;t+1(1 ￿ qt)Vt+1
￿
, (35)
The ￿ ow value of being employed, Wt, and the ￿ ow value of being unemployed, Ut, are
de￿ned with respect to the end of the period after the formation of the current period
matches.
26Data for the U.S. shows that more than 60 % of unemployment spells take less than 14 weeks,
see ￿Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey￿ . For the Euro area the proportion
of short term unemployed (up to a 2 month unemployment spell) in total employment was around 15
% in the period between 2005q1 and 2008q2, according to the OECD Labor Force Survey. Including
also spells until 5 months implies a proportion of roughly 30 percent of short term unemployment in
total unemployment.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a monetary easing ￿Firmspecific labour
vs baseline. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in the quarterly
nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady state. Interest
rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line shows the response
in the e¢ cient bargaining baseline, which separates price setting and wage setting in two di⁄erent
sectors. The red dashed line shows the response of the economy when these two sectors are merged.
25Wt = htwt ￿
￿
￿t
h
1+￿
t
1 + ￿
+ Et
￿
￿t;t+1 [(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿st+1) Wt+1 + ￿(1 ￿ st+1) Ut+1]
￿
; (36)
Ut = b + Et
￿
￿t;t+1 [st+1 Wt+1 + (1 ￿ st+1) Ut+1]
￿
: (37)
Figure 5 shows the response to the monetary easing. The introduction of contempo-
raneous hiring has a direct impact on marginal costs. As matches become productive
within the period, labour adjustment moves from the intensive to the extensive mar-
gin. As a result the reaction of employment is considerably more pronounced and
the reaction of hours per worker is lower than in the baseline. The peak response of
unemployment occurs in the ￿rst period and exceeds the peak response in the baseline
by a factor of two. The strong response of employment implies a lower reaction of
hours and a slightly lower wage response. The overall impact on the in￿ ation response
is small nevertheless.
Figure 5 about here
8 Variants of the vacancy posting process
How vacancy creation moves over the business cycle is essential for determining the re-
sponse of the intensive versus the extensive margin of labour adjustment. As discussed
in section 3.3, this in turn has a bearing on the response of marginal wages, marginal
cost and in￿ ation over the business cycle. This section studies the implications of two
modi￿cations of the vacancy posting process which have been introduced in the RBC
literature on frictional unemployment with the aim of helping the Mortensen and Pis-
sarides model reproduce labour market stylised facts. The ￿rst modi￿cation, following
Yashiv (2006), draws on the intuition that it is easier to incorporate a worker into a
company when employment is high already. The second modi￿cation, following Fujita
and Ramey (2007), eases the free entry condition.
8.1 Employment adjustment costs convex in the hiring rate
In the ￿rst variant of the model, we drop the assumption of a ￿xed recurrent vacancy
posting cost. Instead, we follow Gertler and Trigari (2006) and assume that total
hiring costs are a quadratic function of the hiring rate. The idea is that hiring costs
not only increase with the number of new hires, but also with the ratio of new hires to
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a monetary easing ￿ Contemporaneous
Hiring vs baseline. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in
the quarterly nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady
state. Interest rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line shows
the response in the e¢ cient bargaining baselines. The red dashed line shows the response of the
economy when we allow for contemporaneous hiring.
27existing jobs,27
k
v
t vt =  
￿
mt
nt
￿2
nt (38)
where we assume that the total hiring cost is shared equally among all the ￿rms that
posted a vacancy. Transforming (38), the cost per hiring, kv
t=qt =   mt
nt , is proportional
to the hiring rate mt
nt . This is in contrast to the baseline where the cost per hire typically
increases with nt due to the congestion e⁄ect which is associated with the search and
matching process. All else equal, this will lead to greater variation in employment
and thus less variation in marginal costs and in￿ ation. Using the free entry condition
Vt = 0 and substituting for kv
t, equations (22), (23) and (24) are left unmodi￿ed but for
the substitution of ￿=qt by  mt=nt, so that the dynamics of the job creation condition
will be determined by the hiring rate instead of the probability of ￿lling a vacancy.
Figure 6 about here
Figure 6 shows that hiring reacts more strongly to shocks relative to the baseline and,
so, future real marginal costs react less strongly, reducing the e⁄ect of the shock on
in￿ ation. Quantitatively, however, in our calibration the e⁄ect is tiny.
8.2 Vacancy costs as sunk costs
An alternative to convex costs is a sunk cost as in Fujita and Ramey (2007). In this
case, ￿rms pay a sunk cost only once when they post a new vacancy. Every period,
all the ￿rms that have neither a worker nor vacancy draw their sunk cost, K, out of a
distribution, F(K) . Among these, all the ￿rms endowed with a sunk cost lower than
SCt = Et
￿
￿t;t+1
￿
qtJt+1 + (1 ￿ qt)SCt+1
￿￿
will post a vacancy.
Denoting the newly posted vacancies by vn
t , we obtain that
v
n
t = F(SCt)
and the law of motion of vacancies is:
vt = (1 ￿ qt￿1)vt￿1 + v
n
t : (39)
27The rationale for this way of modelling is in understanding a match as one job in large, multi-
worker ￿rms. The reason why costs per hiring decrease with the labour force is simply that more
employment eases the integration of new hires.
28Let us assume that the cumulative distribution is a linear function of the sunk cost
F(K) = {(K ￿ ￿ k) , { > 0
where ￿ k ￿ 0 is the lowest sunk cost in the distribution while { is a slope parameter. Of
course, the lower (respectively higher) is ￿ k (respectively {), the higher is the number
of new vacancies and the more volatile is employment. Finally, total vacancy posting
costs are given by:
{
Z Vt
￿ k
K dK = {
 
SC
2
t ￿ ￿ k2
2
!
(40)
Note that in this variant, no equation of the baseline model is modi￿ed except for
that governing vacancy posting costs. The corresponding wage equation is obtained
by substituting (14), (16) and (17) into (21) and cannot be further simpli￿ed. As
illustrated by Figure 6 the addition of sunk costs clearly increases vacancy persistence
(since vacancies are now a stock variable rather than a ￿ ow variable) but, again, the
quantitative e⁄ects on the dynamic response of in￿ ation to the shock are weak.
9 On-the-job search
In the baseline only unemployed workers can search, with the result that only they
enter the matching function and can be matched up with vacancies. But, in reality,
currently-employed workers spend at least some of their time looking around for al-
ternative job opportunities. The result of this is that job-to-job movements form a
large part of all job destruction and creation and are, thus, potentially important for
marginal costs over the cycle.28
Following Krause and Lubik (2006) and van Zandweghe (2009), we assume that jobs
come in two types: ￿ good￿jobs (that pay higher wages) and ￿ bad￿jobs (that pay lower
wages). Aggregate output is produced using workers employed in both types of jobs.
The presence of these two types of jobs creates an incentive for workers employed in bad
jobs to search for good jobs. So, good ￿rms are able to recruit from a pool of workers
that includes both those unemployed workers who are searching for good jobs, ug;t, and
those currently employed in bad jobs, et = ￿tnb;t, where ￿t is the search intensity of
employed workers and nb;t is employment in the bad sector. Given this, the relevant
measure of labour market tightness for the ￿ good￿sector will be ~ ￿t = vt
ug;t+et, where
28Akerlof et al. (1988) and Gomes (2008) suggest that job-to-job ￿ ows account for around 50% of
all job separations in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. However, Contini and
Revelli (1997) suggest that the proportion is smaller than this in euro area countries.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a monetary easing when allowing for
different vacancy posting costs than in the baseline and different
vacancy creation technology. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps
reduction in the quarterly nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations
from steady state. Interest rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The solid line
shows the response in the baseline which features constant costs per vacancy over the cycle, and in
which these costs keep open a vacancy for exactly one period. The red dashed line represent the
response in the variant with adjustment costs convex in the hiring rate. The green dotted line is the
response in the variant where vacany costs are sunk.
30ug;t is unemployment of good sector workers. This measure of market tightness will
likely be less volatile than the measure in the baseline model without search on-the-job,
which was given by ￿t = vt
ut. The reason is that job-to-job ￿ ows, et, will be procyclical.
In a boom, more new vacancies will be posted than if there were no on-the-job search;
since employment in the ￿ bad￿sector is procyclical, the number of searching workers
will also be procyclical, increasing the likelihood of ￿lling a vacancy in a boom relative
to the model with no on-the-job search. The ￿rst-order condition for employed search
intensity will be given by:
￿￿￿
￿￿1
t =
￿
1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿m;g
￿
vg;t
ug;t+et
￿1￿#
￿
￿
￿g
￿m;g
￿
vg;t
ug;t+et
￿#
￿
￿b
￿m;b
￿
vb;t
ub;t
￿#￿ (41)
where ￿
￿
t is the cost of searching with intensity ￿t. As can be seen, as more vacancies
are posted, employed workers increase their search intensity, which will lower expected
hiring costs and increase the incentive to post vacancies even further. That is, the
rising search activity of the employed in a boom forms an additional resource in the
matching function that helps to keep hiring costs more stable. The model predicts
that job-to-job ￿ ows rise in booms, in line with the data.
In the model with on-the-job search (and in the baseline model), the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve will continue to be given by (9). Given that ￿nal output is assumed
to be a Cobb-Douglas function of output in each of the two sectors, real marginal cost
will be given by:
xt =
￿
xg;t
1 ￿ !
￿1￿! ￿xb;t
!
￿!
(42)
where ! denotes the share of the output of ￿ bad￿jobs in ￿nal output. With e¢ cient
bargaining over hours, real marginal cost in each sector will again be equal to the
marginal rate of substitution divided by the marginal product of labour in that sector:
xg;t =
￿
￿t
h
1+￿
g;t
￿yl
g;t
(43)
and
xb;t =
￿
￿t
h
1+￿
b;t
￿yl
b;t
(44)
So the response of real marginal cost to demand shocks will depend upon the response
of hours in each sector to such shocks. On-the-job search leads to a reduced response
in hiring costs in response to shocks; as this a⁄ects the extensive margin, this will
reduce the response of future real marginal cost to shocks and, thus presumably, the
31response of in￿ ation.
Figure 7 about here
Despite this, however, Figure 7 shows that even with on-the-job search, the response
of in￿ ation is only slightly smaller than the in￿ ation response in the baseline model.
In turn, this is because of the large and immediate 6% rise in real marginal cost in
response to this shock, o⁄set only slightly by the lower response of real marginal cost
in future periods relative to the baseline.
10 Endogenous job destruction
In much of the literature on frictional labour markets job separation is treated as
an exogenous process, for several reasons: it makes the model easier to solve; it
makes the model easier to calibrate; and it implies a robust negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancies, whereas models that endogenise separation of
have problems replicating the Beveridge curve. However, the separation rate rises in
recessions.29 Therefore, in this section we consider a version of the baseline model with
endogenous separation. This imposes an additional ￿rst-order condition related to the
separation margin and thus further restricts the model￿ s predicted dynamics.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we endogenise separation by assuming that each
match has an idiosyncratic productivity component that is uncorrelated with aggregate
productivity. Thus, the income produced by a match is given by xtzith￿
it, where zit is
the match-speci￿c productivity component and the rest of the notation follows that in
Section 2. We will assume zit is normally distributed with a cumulative distribution
F, with mean 1 and standard deviation ￿z. This distribution will allow us to nest the
exogenous search model as a special case of our endogenous search model associated
with ￿z ￿! 0.30 We will call the reservation productivity at which separation occurs
zt.
Following den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we assume that zit is iid. That
is, zit is uncorrelated with the aggregate shock xt, it is uncorrelated across individual
matches i, and most importantly it is uncorrelated over time. For continuity with
29Sources of evidence for countercyclical separation in Europe include Burda and Wyplosz (1994);
Garibaldi (1998), who shows a negative correlation between job creation and destruction; and Fredrik-
sen (2003) and D￿ Addio and Rosholm (2005), who ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of GDP growth on individual
separation rates. For the US, see Fujita and Ramey (2008). Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) illustrate
that this countercyclicality may be less pronounced than was previously believed.
30We will choose parameters such that continuation is optimal for z = 1, implying a reservation
productivity strictly less than one. In the limit as ￿z ￿! 0, the fraction separating endogenously
goes to zero and the mean of z for continuing matches goes to one. Therefore in this limit the
additional ￿rst-order condition serves only to de￿ne the separation threshold, which has no e⁄ect on
the remaining equations of the model.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a monetary easing when allowing for
search on-the-job. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in
the quarterly nominal interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady
state. Interest rates and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line shows
the response in the baseline which features homogenous jobs, and in which workers are recruited only
out of the unemployment pool. The red dashed line shows the response when allowing for search
on-the-job.
33the rest of the paper, we still include an exogenous separation component: at the end
of each period, existing matches separate for exogenous reasons with probability ￿x.
Allowing for productivity shocks with distribution F in all periods, and reservation
productivity zt, the employment dynamics are:
nt = (1 ￿ F (zt))[(1 ￿ ￿
x)nt￿1 + mt￿1] (45)
The fraction of jobs surviving between periods t ￿ 1 and t is therefore 1 ￿ ￿t ￿
(1 ￿ F (zt))(1 ￿ ￿x). The total number of worker-￿rm pairs that meet at the end
of t ￿ 1 is mt￿1 = ￿m v#
t￿1 u
1￿#
t￿1 , where ut￿1 = 1 ￿ nt￿1 but the number that actually
enter into production at the start of t is only (1 ￿ F (zt))mt￿1.
The rest of the model has the structure spelled out in Section 2. In particular, we
assume e¢ cient bargaining, as in Section 2.4, which now implies that both wages and
hours will depend on the match-speci￿c productivity shock zit. Thus in the analogue
to equation (14), a matched ￿rm￿ s value function is a function of the shock, Jt (zit),
and its ￿ ow of revenues is xtzitht(zit)￿ ￿ wt(zit)ht(zit). A matched worker￿ s value
function Wt (zit) also depends on the shock; the worker￿ s ￿ ow payo⁄s are wt(zit)ht(zit)￿
￿
￿1
t
￿
1+￿ht(zit)1+￿. On the right-hand side of all the Bellman equations there will
therefore be expectations of future values with respect to zit+1.
E¢ cient bargaining over hours gives a ￿rst-order condition which is equivalent to (20),
except that it also takes into account the idiosyncratic productivity shock:
ht (z) = (￿xt￿t=￿)
1
1+￿￿￿ z
1
1+￿￿￿ ￿ Htz
1
1+￿￿￿ (46)
Thus hours are proportional to z
1
1+￿￿￿ with the time-varying factor of proportional-
ity Ht, which will help us aggregate hours and wages. This allows us to integrate
across productivity to express all quantities in aggregate terms. After some algebraic
manipulation, the job creation Euler equation analogous to (24) becomes
￿
qt
= Et
(
￿t;t+1
"
(1￿￿)(1+￿￿￿)
1+￿
xt+1ct+1
nt+1
￿
￿
1 ￿ F
￿
zt+1
￿￿
(￿￿￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)b) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿t+1
￿
￿
qt+1
#)
(47)
The reservation productivity zt satis￿es the job destruction equation Jt (zt) = 0. Elim-
inating the wage and expected future values from the Bellman equation for J, the job
destruction equation can be written as
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿
xtH
￿
t z
1+￿
1+￿￿￿
t ￿ ￿￿￿t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b + (1 ￿ ￿
x)
￿
qt
= 0 (48)
Calibrating this version of the model requires us to determine what fraction of separa-
34tions are endogenous. For the US, Davis and Haltiwanger (1995) roughly calculated the
fraction of endogenous separations in US data by comparing ￿rm-level job destruction
(which they argue should re￿ ect changes in ￿rms￿labour demand, and therefore map
into the model￿ s endogenous component) with total worker separation ￿ ows (which are
larger, and should include worker-initiated changes in employment status which they
map into the model￿ s exogenous component). They ￿nd that the endogenous compo-
nent is roughly 40% of the total, which ￿absent evidence for the euro area ￿is the
number we will use here. Then for any standard deviation ￿z of the idiosyncratic shock,
we can calculate z = F ￿1 (0:4 ￿ 0:06), assuming 6% total separation ￿ ows as before, and
from z we can calculate all the integrals over z that appear in the equations.
Other parameters can be backed out as before: ￿m can be deduced from observed job
￿ ows, and ￿ can be chosen so that (46) is satis￿ed. Finally, we can choose ￿ and b for
consistency with the job creation and job destruction equations, (47) and (48). For
a given ￿z, this makes the replacement ratio endogenous, so this calibration strategy
will not automatically generate the same replacement rate used in previous sections of
the paper. Therefore, we have simulated the model for a range of values ￿z, looking
for a parameterisation that implies the same replacement ratio assumed in the baseline
model. When we set the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to ￿z = 0:4, we
obtain a 65% replacement ratio, as in the baseline model.
Figure 8 about here
For this parameterisation, Fig. 8 shows the impulse responses for endogenous sepa-
ration together with those of the exogenous separation model that has the same re-
placement ratio (65%). The monetary stimulus primarily goes into wages. The overall
stimulative e⁄ect of the money shock is relatively small.31 As the ￿gure shows, hours
per worker and vacancies both rise, but separation and unemployment increase, too, for
this calibration. While in￿ ation and most other aggregate variables behave similarly in
the two cases, the introduction of endogenous separation thus leads to counterfactual
implications for unemployment. We thus con￿rm a previous ￿nding in the literature,
e.g., Krause and Lubik (2007), that even when endogenising separation has little im-
pact on quantities outside of the labour market, it can be very hard to force all the
margins of labour market adjustment to co-move realistically.
31 Interestingly, there are various parameter regions implying major qualitative changes in the
impulse responses, including regions of indeterminacy. For example, setting ￿z = 0:1, which leads
to a replacement ratio of 84%, we ￿nd that a monetary stimulus causes a large fall in the separation
rate. Under these parameters, unemployment is more volatile (and responds in the right direction)
and wages and in￿ ation are much smoother. Thus, while the parameterisation with ￿z = 0:4 fails
to improve the model￿ s in￿ ation predictions, the e⁄ects of endogenous separation di⁄er (and improve
relative to the data) at ￿z = 0:1.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a monetary easing, model with endogenous
separation vs. model with exogenous separation, alternative calibra-
tion. Shown are impulse responses to an unanticipated 100 bps reduction in the quarterly nominal
interest rate in quarter 0. All entries are in percentage deviations from steady state. Interest rates
and in￿ ation rates are reported in annualized terms. The black solid line refers to the response in
a model, which features only exogenous separation between ￿rms and workers. Apart from slight
di⁄erences in the calibration (described in the main text body) this resembles the baseline model.
The red dashed line marks the responses when allowing for endogenous separation. Shown is the case
with a low standard deviation of the idiosyncratic technology shock, ￿z = 0:4:
3611 Conclusions
In this paper, we have assessed the ability of labour market variants in a New Keynesian
model to explain in￿ ation dynamics using, as our empirical benchmark, the responses
of variables to a monetary policy shock in the euro area. Our results are largely
negative and are collected in Table 3, below. We ￿rst used a standard New Keynesian
model with search and matching frictions and e¢ cient bargaining to show that such
models typically generate a response of in￿ ation to nominal shocks that is much too
large relative to the data. We then considered many, if not most, of the alternative
speci￿cations that currently exist in the literature.
Out-
put
In￿ a-
tion
Unem-
ploy-
ment
Em-
ploy-
ment
Real
wages
per
empl.
Real
wage
per
hour
Total
hours
wor-
ked
Hours
per
empl-
oyee
Euro area data 0.6 0.3 -4.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.04
Baseline (e⁄. barg.) 0.4 2.3 -0.9 0.1 3.5 3.1 0.4 0.4
RTM bargaining 0.4 2.3 -0.3 0.0 5.2 4.8 0.4 0.4
Sticky wages (EB) 0.5 2.3 -1.7 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.5
Sticky wages (RTM) 1.1 0.0 -0.6 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.1
Firm-level real rigidity 1.01 0.1 -0.3 0.03 1.03 0.03 1.02 1.02
Contempor. hiring 0.5 2.0 -1.7 0.2 3.1 2.8 0.5 0.3
Hiring costs (convex) 0.5 2.4 -1.1 0.1 3.6 3.1 0.5 0.5
Hiring costs (sunk) 0.4 2.4 -0.7 0.1 3.4 3.0 0.4 0.4
On-the-job search 0.5 2.2 -3.2 0.3 4.1 3.6 0.6 0.5
Endog. separation 0.3 2.9 2.8 -0.3 5.2 4.8 0.1 0.4
Table 3: Peak responses to a 100 bps monetary easing in the models and
in the data. Top: euro area data (cp. the appendix for details). Then: baseline
model with e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and right-to-manage bargaining (RTM); models
with EB and RTM and sticky wages for new and existing matches; real rigidities
arising at the ￿rm-level due to ￿rm-speci￿c labour; contemporaneous hiring instead
of a one-period lag; di⁄erent forms of hiring costs (period by period but convex in
the hiring rate, or sunk); on-the-job search; and allowing for endogenous separation.
Relative to the baseline, each of the models changes one feature at a time. From left
to right: output, in￿ ation, unemployment, employment, real wages per employee, real
wage per hour, total hours worked, hours per employee. All variables are expressed
in log percentage deviation from steady state.
We ￿rst considered the addition of wage rigidity. Under e¢ cient bargaining, wage
stickiness in existing jobs has no e⁄ect since average wages in existing jobs are non-
allocative. But, wage stickiness in newly-created jobs does have an e⁄ect. In this case,
the existing wage rate will a⁄ect real marginal cost, since the wage paid to new hires
37a⁄ects hiring incentives and, thus, marginal costs. Combined with a ￿ right-to-manage￿
assumption for the determination of hours (which implies a direct channel from wages
to in￿ ation), staggered wages at the level of the match will help to smooth the reaction
of the aggregate wage, resulting in a smaller response to shocks of marginal cost and
in￿ ation. When we then combined this nominal rigidity with the real rigidity of ￿rm-
speci￿c labour, we found that prices respond less to shocks the more any individual
￿rm￿ s marginal cost responds to a change in that ￿rm￿ s price. Hence, the response of
in￿ ation to nominal shocks is reduced if the marginal disutility of work is increasing
in hours worked and/or there are decreasing returns to labour; both these conditions
hold in our calibrated model.
Given the central role of employment dynamics for marginal costs, we then looked at
variants of the hiring cost function which have been proposed to imply stronger and
more persistent employment ￿ uctuations. We found that neither of the modi￿cations
we considered materially a⁄ected the response of in￿ ation to nominal shocks. Finally,
we considered two other margins along which adjustment can occur in the labour
market: on-the-job search and endogenous job destruction. We found that both
features could help reduce the response of in￿ ation to shocks. However, the e⁄ects
were not particularly strong. In addition, the e⁄ects of endogenising job destruction
depend critically on the calibration of the model, and some of the implications for other
model variables were counterfactual.
In summary, we found that a model with sticky nominal wages when combined with
right-to-manage bargaining was best able to capture the response of in￿ ation to nom-
inal shocks. Reassuringly, in that setup it was also largely irrelevant whether wage
stickiness a⁄ected only existing matches or also new matches. More generally, our re-
sults suggest that the extent to which the labour market matters for in￿ ation dynamics
depends crucially on its microeconomic structure.
For future work, it would therefore be interesting to test the mechanisms we have
explored using microeconomic data. Work on wage stickiness for new hires that has
recently been conducted, eg, by Haefke et al. (2008) is a ￿rst step in that direction.
Microeconomic evidence on bargaining, and contractual arrangements regarding state
contingency of the wage, overtime payments and premia, overtime accounts and non-
wage components of compensation, would be a valuable further step towards assessing
the relative merits of these di⁄erent labour market setups.
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12 Appendix A: further evidence on monetary trans-
mission in the euro area
In the paper, we benchmarked the di⁄erent approaches to modelling the labour market
against ￿ve stylised facts about the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area.
43This section presents the background evidence from which we deduced these stylised
facts.32 Figure 9 prints the impulse responses of euro area aggregates to a 100 basis
point monetary shock (an easing) in McCallum and Smets (2008), who estimate a
Factor-Augmented VAR following the methodology of Bernanke et al. (2005).33 Also
shown are the boundaries of bootstrapped 90% con￿dence intervals. A monetary
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to an unanticipated monetary shock in the
euro area, source: McCallum and Smets (2008). Depicted are responses to a
100 bps monetary easing (annualized nominal rates). Charts refer to the euro area. The sample
is 1987Q1 to 2005Q4. Top row (from left to right): response of real GDP (in percentage deviation
from trend), quarter-on-quarter GDP in￿ ation (in annualized percentage points), unemployment (in
percentage deviation from trend). Note: shown is the response of log unemployment (heads), log(ut).
Bottom row: response of nominal interest rate (in annualized percentage points) and the real wage
per employee (in percentage deviation from trend). Source: McCallum, Smets (2008), reprinted with
the author￿ s permission.
easing stimulates the economy. According to this evidence, at its peak output has
risen by about 0.8% above steady state. In￿ ation increases, too, but in a muted
manner. The peak increase in quarter-on-quarter GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation is about 25
basis points (in annualised terms). As a consequence of higher demand, the number
32A number of studies have examined the response of real and nominal variables in the euro area
to a monetary shock using alternative identi￿cation mechanisms. For early evidence on the euro area
as a whole see, eg, Peersman and Smets (2003) and Angeloni et al. (2003). More recent papers are
McCallum and Smets (2008) and Peersman and Straub (2007). For evidence country by country see,
eg, Mojon and Peersman (2003) and Normandin (2006).
33Their data comprise quarterly euro area aggregates and a number of euro-area country-speci￿c
series from 1987Q1 to 2005Q4, as well as foreign series.
44of unemployed people, ie, unemployment, falls by 3%.34 The increase in economic
activity also translates into an increase in the real wage per employee. That increase
is about half the size of the increase in output, but is highly persistent.
Complementing this evidence, Figure 10 reports our own estimates of the monetary
transmission in the euro area. The sample starts in 1987Q1 as in McCallum and
Smets (2008), and runs through 2006Q4. We estimated a standard VAR(4) in the
variables shown in the graphs, and identi￿ed the monetary shock through the oft-used
recursive ordering scheme. For details see the notes to Figure 10. According to
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to an unanticipated monetary shock ￿own
estimates. Underlying the results is a VAR(4) estimated on above data (taken from the AWM data
set except four hours worked, which is taken from Christo⁄el et al., 2008). The sample is 1987Q1 to
2006Q4, identi￿cation relies on the usual Cholesky decomposition. The data was de-trended variable
by variable prior to running the VAR. For real variables, we allow for a trend, and a break in the
trend plus a level shift in 1991Q1 so as to accommodate German reuni￿cation. In￿ ation and mominal
interest rates were regressed on a linear trend, which breaks after 1998Q4 in order to account for the
disin￿ ation in the euro area prior to the introduction of the common currency, and the constancy of
the in￿ ation objective thereafter. Dotted lines mark asymptotic 90% con￿dence intervals (5% and
95% bounds).
these estimates, an unanticipated monetary easing induces a longer-lived deviation of
34The depicted fall in unemployment corresponds to a fall in the unemployment rate of about
0.27 percentage points. Unemployment is calculated in a model-consistent way from the response in
employment, which McCallum and Smets report, by assuming that the labor force does not react to
a monetary easing, and that average unemployment rates are 9%.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses of hours and wages to a monetary shock ￿
own estimates. Shown are the responses of employment, hours per employee and the real wage
rate. The VAR is the same as in Figure 10, except that the a measure of hours per worker and of the
real hour wage rate replaces the measures for total hours worked and the real wage per employee.
nominal rates from the baseline than in McCallum and Smets (2008) and, as a result,
most responses are more persistent. With regard to amplitudes, the evidence above is
robust. A monetary easing of 100 basis points causes a signi￿cant increase in output
of about 0.8% at its peak, and an increase in real wages per employee of about half that
size (which is, again, highly persistent). Unemployment, according to our estimates,
falls by 6%.35 At the same time, the increase in in￿ ation remains contained, with
GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation remaining below 0.4 percentage points in annualised terms.
In the above estimation, we resort to the same proxy for hours worked in the euro area
as used by Christo⁄el et al. (2009).36 When using this series to infer hourly wage
rates and hours worked per employee, the results suggest that changes at the extensive
margin are more relevant for labour adjustment than hours worked per employee.
The ￿rst two panels of Figure 11 suggest that hours worked per employee react little
throughout the period (and if anything, they fall), while the number of employees is
more responsive. As a result, the increase in wages per employee depicted in Figure
10 is mainly attributed to a slow but persistent increase in hourly wages instead of an
increase in hours per worker. (See Figure 11.) Due to the limitations of the euro area
data with respect to hours worked or hourly wages, however, the responses in Figure
11 ￿while indicative ￿should be taken with some caution.
Finally, Table 4 summarises the impulse responses reported above, and augments these
with the evidence of three further studies. Angeloni et al. (2003) report impulse re-
sponses for the euro area based on various identi￿cation schemes for the monetary
35This translates into a reduction in the unemployment rate of about 0.54 percentage points.
36Unfortunately, harmonized quarterly series for hours worked do not exist for the euro area. The
proxy uses the quarterly real GDP series for the euro area to interpolate annual EU-Klems data on
total hours worked in the euro area.
46shock in a VAR. So do Peersman and Smets (2003). The table, in addition, collects
evidence of a recent study by Peersman and Straub (2007) who identify a monetary
shock (and other shocks) based on sign restrictions, which were derived from a pro-
totypical New Keynesian model. The table summarises the maximum amplitudes of
the variables following the monetary shock. Most of the studies imply that after the
initial shock, nominal rates fall somewhat further before being tightened. In order to
harmonise the studies, all responses have been normalised by the maximum easing of
the nominal interest rate that these studies report.
Out-
put
In￿ . Un-
empl.
Empl. Real
wages
per
empl.
Real
wage
per
hour
Total
hours
wor-
ked
Hours
per
empl.
McCallum,Smets (1) 0.7 0.2 -2.9 0.3 0.4 ￿ ￿ ￿
Own VAR (2) 0.6 0.3 -4.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.04
Peersman,Straub (3) 0.3 0.2 -2.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0
Angeloni et al. (4) 0.5 0.2 -3.3 0.3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Peersman,Smets (5) 0.5 0.2 -3.3 0.3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Table 4: Peak responses to a monetary easing in the literature. Most
of the studies imply that after the initial easing, nominal rates fall somewhat further before they
tighten. In order harmonize the studies, all responses have been normalized by the maximum easing
of the nominal interest rate that these studies report (which in all studies occurs one quarter after
the shock). Entries in small type refer to numbers that have been deduced indirectly as described
below. (1): McCallum and Smets (2008) report the response of employment. The response for
unemployment is inferred from the ￿gure for employment assuming a constant labor force and
an average unemployment rate of 9%. (2): Own VAR: hours worked data for the euro area is
subject to measurement errors as stated in the main text. (3): Peersman and Straub (2007) only
report the response of total hours worked, but state that responses are similar when employment
is used. We thus report the same response of employment as for total hours worked. The response
for unemployment is inferred as in (1). Similarly, hourly wage rates and hours per employee are
inferred from this statement. (4): Peersman, Smets (2003): sample 1980-1998. Entries are based
on their Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.8. The response for unemployment is inferred as in note (1). (5):
Angeloni et al. (2003) report the response of the unemployment rate (see their Table 6). The
response of unemployment reported here is obtained using an unemployment rate of 9%. Figures
for employment were obtained accordingly. Results for the Angeloni et al. paper are averages over
di⁄erent speci￿cations for the sample 1980-2001. Only the response of consumer prices is reported.
Results were read-o⁄ the Figures and Tables in their paper.
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